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I. Introduction
Recent amendments to section 527 of the code require
tax-exempt political organizations to disclose contributions
to and expenditures of the organization.2 If organizations fail
to make such disclosures, they lose the benefit of their tax-
exempt status. This article looks at the recent district court
decision involving section 527 and examines the ramifica-
tions of the decision for exempt organizations and for cam-
paign finance reform advocates.
During the 2000 presidential primaries, Republicans for
Clean Air ran a series of advertisements attacking Senator
John McCain’s record on the environment and praising then-
Governor George W. Bush’s.  Republicans for  Clean Air
claimed that its advertisements were only “issue advertising”
and did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office, and were not subject to federal
election law. Republicans for Clean Air claimed it was not
therefore required to disclose its contributors or its expendi-
tures in any manner.
The advertisements sponsored by Republicans for Clean
Air were simply one example of what was seen as abuses by
tax-exempt entities seeking to influence federal elections.
The proliferation of independent expenditures during politi-
cal campaigns and the difficulty in identifying the source of
those expenditures increased the pressure for reform of cam-
paign regulations that apply to advocacy by political organi-
zations. After the primary campaign, Senator McCain joined
with Senators Joe Lieberman (then a vice-presidential can-
didate) and Russ Feingold to craft legislation requiring the
disclosure of the names of contributors to, and expenditures
Donald B. Tobin
1In the spirit of section 527 and full disclosure, in my previous
employment I was an attorney at the Department of Justice and was part
of a team of attorneys involved in crafting the government’s position in
National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States (S.D.
A1a. 2001) (No. 00-759-RV-C). A more thorough analysis of section
527, and the constitutionality of campaign finance disclosure provisions
in the code will appear in the forthcoming winter issue of the GEORGIA
LAW REVIEW. See Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527
of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. (Winter 2003).
2A political organization is defined as a “party, committee, associa-
tion, fund, or other organization . . . organized and operated primarily
for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making
expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.” IRC section 527(e)(1).
Exempt function “means the function of influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual” to a public office. IRC section 527(e)(2).
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of, what they termed “stealth PACs.”3 Because the Supreme
Court had previously struck down campaign disclosure pro-
visions in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) asso-
ciated with issue advocacy,4 Senators McCain, Lieberman,
and Feingold took another approach. Senators McCain, Lie-
berman, and Feingold sought to use the tax code as a mecha-
nism for requiring independent third-party organizations to
make campaign  disclosures similar to those contained in
FECA. The senators accomplished this by amending section
527 of the Internal Revenue Code, the section that deals with
the tax status of political organizations. The reformers
amended section 527 and created campaign finance disclo-
sure provisions in the tax code by conditioning tax benefits
on compliance with the disclosure provisions. After the pro-
posed changes were enacted into law, opponents almost im-
mediately filed suit attacking the constitutionality of the pro-
visions and alleging that the disclosure provisions violated
plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendment rights.5
II. How Section 527 Operates
There are at least three possible ways to interpret section
527’s disclosure provisions. The government’s interpretation
views section 527 as an elective provision with two main
attributes. Under this interpretation, section 527(i) provides
organizations with a choice of whether they want the benefits
of section 527 tax-exempt status or not. If the organization
seeks the benefit of tax-exempt status under section 527, it
must file a designation to that effect with the Secretary of
Treasury.6 If an organization fails to file an election to be a
political organization under section 527, the organization is
taxed on its otherwise exempt function income (defined as
amounts received as a contribution of money or other prop-
erty, membership dues, or proceeds from a political fun-
draiser).7 Second, once an entity registers as a section 527
organization, to be exempt from tax the entity is required to
file quarterly reports,8 and disclose its expenditures and con-
tributors.9 Specifically, subsection (j)(3)(A) provides that en-
tities electing to be tax-exempt political organizations must
disclose the amount of each expenditure of $500 or more and
the name and address of the person to whom the payment
was made.10 And subsection (j)(3)(B) requires the disclosure
of the name and address of each contributor who contributed
in the aggregate $200 or more to the organization during the
calendar year.11
If an entity has elected to be a section 527 political or-
ganization by filing a notice under subsection (i) and it fails
to disclose under subsection (j), the entity is penalized (or
taxed) on the amount “to which the failure relates.”12 Under
the government’s interpretation of the statute, an entity can
elect to be a section 527 organization and disclose either
some, all, or none of its contributors and expenditures. Under
subsection (j), the entity would be taxed on those contribu-
tions or expenditures that it failed to disclose.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that all entities, even those that
choose to opt-out under 527(i), are subject to the disclosure
provision in subsection (j). They contend that the disclosure
provisions are therefore mandatory on all entities meeting
the definition of a political organization.13
A third option, not advocated by either party, is that an
entity has a choice whether to opt-in to the regulatory scheme
or not. If an entity opts-out, its income is taxed. If it opts-in,
it agrees to comply with the regulatory requirements of the
section and must disclose all contributions and expenditures.
Thus, subsection (j) applies to political organizations that file
with the secretary under (i), but not to other organizations
who chose to opt-out and pay the tax due under (i)(4). Under
this interpretation, (j) operates as a penalty to those organi-
zations that opt-in but fail to disclose specific contributions
or expenditures. Thus, organizations have a choice whether
to opt-in, accept tax-exempt status, and comply with the
disclosure provisions in section 527, or opt-out, pay tax on
their income, and not disclose their contributors or expendi-
3146 Cong. Rec. 55995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman); see also S. 2582, S. 2583, 106th Cong. (2000).
4Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
5See National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. U.S.,
F.Supp.2d , 2002 WL 2008245 (S.D. Ala. ) (Aug. 27, 2002) [here-
inafter NFRA]. Plaintiffs include the National Federation of Republican
Assemblies, the Alabama and Mobile Republican Assembly, the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association and political action committee, the Liber-
tarian National Committee, and Paul Haughton. Id. at *1, note 1.
6IRC section 527(i) (2002). An organization meets this requirement
by filing Form 8871, Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status
with the IRS. Rev. Rul. 2000-49, 2000-44 IRB 430.
7IRC section 527(c)(3), (i)(4) (2002). Under subsection (b) an or-
ganization’s income is taxed at the highest corporate tax rate.
8If a regularly scheduled election is to be held during a specific
calendar year the political organization must file a quarterly report, a
pre-election report, and a post-general election report. IRC sections
527(j)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (III) (2002). If a regular election is not scheduled
for a particular year, an organization must file semi-annual reports. IRC
section 527(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2002).
9IRC section 527(j)(2) (2002). The organization makes this disclo-
sure by filing Form 8872, Political Organizations Reports of Contribu-
tors and Expenditures, Rev. Rul. 2000-29, 44 IRB 430. The IRS was
also required to make the reports available on the Internet. IRC section
6104(a)(3)(2002). See http://eforms.irs.gov (IRS Web site listing disclo-
sure reports for political organizations).
10Expenditure is defined as “a payment, distribution, loan, advance,
or deposit, of money, or anything of value. . . .” IRC section 527(e)(4)
(2002), referencing IRC section 271(b)(3) (2002). If applied literally,
this definition would require the disclosure of amounts spent to purchase
office equipment.
11IRC section 527(j)(3) (2002). Contribution is defined as “a gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value.
. . .” IRC section 527(e)(3)(2002), referencing IRC section 271(b)(2)
(2002). The information required in these reports is almost identical to
the information required in reports made by organizations pursuant to
FECA. See 2 U.S.C. section 434(a) (2002).
12IRC section 527(j)(1) (2002).
13Plaintiffs in National Federation of Republican Assemblies contend
that they are not just subject to tax on the nondisclosed amount but are
subject to criminal penalties under IRC section 7203.
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tures. Organizations may not choose to opt-in and then dis-
close only some contributions or expenditures.
III. District Court Decision
The district court took an interesting and sometimes con-
fusing approach to analyzing the statute. Instead of analyzing
section 527 as one aggregate tax provision, it divided the
provision into two parts and considered the provisions in
subsections (i) and (j) independently. In a previous decision,14
it determined that subsection (i), which provides an organi-
zation must opt-in to the regulatory scheme or be subject to
tax on its income, was a tax provision and that plaintiffs could
not enjoin the collection of a tax under the Anti-Injunction
Act. The court further determined that subsection (j), which
requires exempt organizations to pay the top corporate rate
on any undisclosed contribution or expenditure, was a pen-
alty, and that plaintiffs could properly contest the constitu-
tionality of subsection (j).15 Therefore, the suit proceeded as
an attack only on the constitutionality of subsection (j).
In its recent decision, the district court concluded that the
disclosure provisions in subsection (j) are constitutional as
they apply to contributions to political organizations involved
in influencing federal elections, but unconstitutional as they
apply to organizations involved in only local or state elec-
tions. Moreover, the district court held that the expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional.
A. First Amendment Analysis
The court first recognized that subsection (j) applies only
to organizations that elect to be treated as section 527 organi-
zations under subsection (i). Organizations that opt-out under
subsection (i) are taxable under (i)(4) on all of their income
including exempt function income, which includes contribu-
tions to the organization. The court noted that an organization
does not have a right to a tax deduction or tax-exempt status
and that Congress can condition a tax subsidy on an entity’s
willingness to comply with regulatory requirements.16 It thus
concluded that if Congress was conditioning a tax subsidy
on  an entity’s willingness to comply  with the disclosure
requirements, the traditional First Amendment campaign fi-
nance analysis under Buckley v. Valeo did not apply.17 The
court then examined subsection (j) to determine whether
Congress permissibly conditioned an  entity’s tax-exempt
status on its willingness to comply with campaign finance
disclosure requirements.
1. Contributions to Political Organizations
With regard to contributions to political organizations, the
court found that Congress permissibly conditioned a tax-
exemption on an organization’s willingness to disclose cam-
paign contributions. First, it concluded that campaign con-
tributions could be treated as income for tax purposes, and
second, it found that by denying those benefits to organiza-
tions that failed to disclose contributions, Congress merely
removed its tax subsidy for those specific disclosures. It
therefore found the campaign contribution disclosure provi-
sions in subsection (j)(3)(B) constitutional.18
2. Expenditures of Political Organizations
The court took a very different approach with regard to
the expenditure disclosure provisions. The court recognized
that under subsection (j) an exempt organization that failed
to disclose its contributions and expenditures could incur a
penalty (or a tax) greater than its income. Specifically, an
organization that failed to disclose both its contributions and
expenditures would be subject to a penalty of 57 percent.19
The court believed that subsection (j) as it applied to expen-
ditures went beyond merely withdrawing a tax subsidy, since
the amount the exempt organization was required to pay
exceeded the amount of the subsidy. The court therefore
concluded that the First Amendment analysis in Buckley v.
Valeo and not the subsidy analysis in Regan v. Taxpayers with
Representation applied.20
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court set out the traditional struc-
ture for analyzing Congress’s ability to require the disclosure
of campaign contributions and expenditures. The Buckley
line of cases indicate when individuals and organizations
must comply with the disclosure provisions in FECA. These
cases have established the traditional “issue advocacy” v.
“express advocacy” distinction. Express advocacy is defined
as communication containing express words of advocacy
such as “vote for,” “elect,” and “vote against.”21 Under the
traditional Buckley approach, it is express advocacy that can
clearly be subjected to campaign finance regulation.
Plaintiffs argued that because the communication here was
not express advocacy, under Buckley the disclosure provi-
sions violated the First Amendment. The court rejected plain-
tiffs’ reading of Buckley but ultimately held that the expen-
diture disclosure provisions violated the First Amendment.
The court first rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that only ex-
press advocacy could be regulated consistent with the First
Amendment. It claimed that the issue/express advocacy di-
chotomy presented by plaintiffs was in fact incorrect, and
14National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States,
148 F.Supp.2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
15Id. at 1280.
16NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *11; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 451 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
547 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
17Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976); NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245,
*11.
18NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *12.
19For example, if an organization fails to disclose both contributions
and expenditures, the first $100 it receives will be taxed at 35 percent,
causing the organization to pay a tax of $35. Once the remaining $65
is spent, the organization must once again pay tax on that amount,
causing a tax of $22.75. The total tax on the $100 will be $57.75.
20Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)
(“We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right,
and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”).
21Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n. 52 (sometimes referred to as magic
words “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for
Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” “reject.”).
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that communication that was not express advocacy still might
not be considered issue advocacy.22 In other words, the ab-
sence of express advocacy did not necessarily constitute issue
advocacy. Instead, the court believed Buckley classified
speech into “issue discussion” and “advocacy of a political
result.”23 Advocacy of a political result, however, extends
further than the current definition of express advocacy. It was
this latter speech, speech advocating a political result, that
the district court believed could be regulated consistent with
the First Amendment.24
The district court recognized that in the context of provi-
sions dealing with caps on independent expenditures, which
apply to expenditures “advocating the election or defeat of
[a] candidate,” the Supreme Court found the language un-
constitutionally vague because “the distinction between dis-
cussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical applica-
tion.”25 The Supreme Court, therefore, created a bright line
test to ensure that individuals engaged in purely issue dis-
cussion would not find themselves inadvertently engaging in
speech that made them subject to the act. The issue/express
advocacy distinction presented just such a line.
The district court recognized, however, that the issue/ex-
press advocacy distinction was not universal. At most, it only
applies to organizations whose major purpose  is  not the
nomination or election of candidates for public office.26 Po-
litical committees, defined as organizations whose “major
purpose is the nomination or election of a candidate” may be
regulated even if they are not engaged in express advocacy
because their speech is “by definition, campaign related.”27
The court noted that political organizations are similar to
political committees because by definition section 527 or-
ganizations are created to influence the election of an indi-
vidual to public office, and that Congress may constitutionally
require disclosure of political organizations even if they are
not engaged in express advocacy.28
But after the court concluded that political organizations’
speech could be regulated, it held that the expenditure dis-
closure provisions in subsection (j) were constitutionally de-
ficient. The court concluded that under Buckley the regulation
must still “bear[] a sufficient relationship to a substantial
government interest” and that the expenditure disclosure pro-
visions failed to satisfy such an interest. Specifically, the court
rejected the assertion that either the “informational interest”
or the “corruption rationale” that justified the regulation in
Buckley was present here.
With regard to the informational interest, the court be-
lieved that the expenditure disclosure provisions did not sat-
isfy an informational interest because they in no way tied the
contribution to a candidate. The court concluded that absent
such a tie the provision could not promote the informational
interest of “increas[ing] the fund of information concerning
those who support candidates.”29
The court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the
corruption rationale. The court acknowledged that Buckley
recognized that “disclosure requirements deter actual corrup-
tion,” but found that in this case the corruption rationale did
not apply because the expenditure disclosure requirements
do not require the disclosure of the candidate that benefits
from the expenditures.30 The district court therefore con-
cluded that due to the attenuated risk of corruption when
independent expenditures are involved, there must be affirm-
ative evidence in support of the government’s claimed inter-
est.31 The court concluded that the “sufficiency of the gov-
ernment’s corruption interest is supported only in certain
applications, with vast portions of its reach unsupported by
the articulated interest.” Accordingly, it concluded that “sec-
tion 527(j) is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s
interest in combating actual or perceived corruption.”32
B. Fifth Amendment
In addition to arguing that section 527 violated the First
Amendment, plaintiffs also argued that the disclosure provi-
sions violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment because the disclosure provisions do not apply to other
exempt organizations that may receive contributions or make
expenditures for the purpose of influencing elections.33 The
court concluded that statutory classifications are generally
valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate government
purpose, but that statutes that infringe on fundamental rights
are subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The court concluded
that the contribution disclosure limitations were subject to
rational basis scrutiny because the provision did not implicate
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, but the expenditure limi-
tations were subject to strict scrutiny because they did impli-
cate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
The court then upheld the contribution disclosure provi-
sions under rational basis scrutiny, but rejected the expendi-
ture provisions under a strict scrutiny analysis. In applying
strict scrutiny, the court determined that under Regan Con-
gress could have required all tax-exempt organizations to
disclose their expenditures, and that its failure to do so raises
Fifth Amendment  concerns. The court further found that
because the government failed to establish that political or-
ganizations are sufficiently different from other exempt or-
ganizations in ways that justify treating them differently,
22NFRA, 2002 WL 2008245, *15.
23Id. at *15-16, citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
24Id.
25Id. at *16 citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
26Id.
27Id. at *19-20, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
28Specifically, section 527 provides that a political organization is
an entity organized or operated for the purpose of influencing or at-
tempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment
of an individual to public office. IRC section 527 (e).




33Id. at *26-27. Labor unions, social welfare organizations, and other
section 501 organizations are not subject to the disclosure provisions.
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527(j)’s expenditure disclosure provisions violate the equal
protection clause.34
C. Tenth Amendment
Section 527’s disclosure provisions specifically apply to
local and state electoral advocacy.35 Plaintiffs contended that
Congress does not have the power to regulate state elections
and that the provisions in section 527, as they pertain to
organizations involved in state and local elections, violate
the Tenth Amendment because Congress did not exercise its
taxing power when it enacted section 527(j). The district
court agreed with plaintiffs and concluded that Congress in
passing section 527(j) was not exercising its taxing power
but was instead attempting to regulate state and local elec-
tions.36 The court noted that section 527(j) was not designed
to raise revenue or aid in tax collection, but instead was an
attempt by the government to regulate elections. Finally, the
court noted that a political organization’s tax liability is not
impacted by the content of its disclosures or by the failure
to make disclosures (because it believes subsection (j) is a
penalty), and section 527(j), therefore, does not “assist in
determining the fact or amount of tax liability.”37
The court concluded that “while the taxing power author-
izes Congress to legislate in an area otherwise reserved to
the states,” the statute at issue was not enacted pursuant to
that power. It stated, “[b]ecause section 527(j) is not a revenue
measure and does not serve any revenue purpose, the court
concludes that on its face section 527(j) reflects Congress’s
purpose to regulate state and local electoral advocacy.”38
IV. Commentary on Decision
The district court decision raises complex and important
tax, election, and constitutional law issues. Although the court
struck down the expenditure-related disclosure provisions in
subsection (j), the decision is a resounding win for the gov-
ernment and for election law reform advocates.
A. Subsidy Rationale
First, this case accepted the government’s argument that
Regan v. Taxpayers with Representation was the appropriate
authority for initially examining the constitutionality of the
provision, and recognized that contributions to an exempt
organization could be taxable to that organization as income.
By concentrating on  the subsidy  rationale in Regan,  the
district court was able to uphold the contribution disclosure
provisions without resorting to an analysis under Buckley.
By accepting that Regan and not Buckley controls the case,
the district court acknowledged that significant campaign
finance reform provisions for exempt organizations will be
considered constitutional as long as the provisions are con-
ditions on an organization’s exempt status.
In fact, even the court’s determination that expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional can easily be modi-
fied to address the court’s concerns. The court concluded that
due to the fact that contributions and expenditures could be
taxed (or penalized) under subsection (j), the amount paid
under subsection (j) could exceed the amount of the tax
subsidy. It found this fact dispositive as to why the subsidy
rationale did not apply to the expenditure disclosure provi-
sions.
This concern, however, can be dealt with in three different
ways. First, subsection (j) could be amended to state that the
penalty imposed under subsection (j) may never exceed that
amount that would have been due under (i)(4). This ensures
that (j) only operates to eliminate that tax subsidy and does
not produce a penalty in excess of that subsidy. If Congress
so amended the statute, both the contribution and expenditure
disclosure provisions would be constitutional under the
court’s opinion.
Second, that the amount paid under (j) should never exceed
the amount owed under (i)(4) can reasonably be implied by
the current statutory scheme. Although the district court rec-
ognized and then disregarded the fact that an organization
should not end up paying more under (j) than it would have
paid under (i)(4), common sense tells us that this will almost
always be the case. An organization not wishing to disclose
contributions or expenditures will simply choose not to file
with the Secretary under (i) and will be taxed on its income,
including contributions, under (i)(4). It is only those organi-
zations that plan on disclosing contributions and expendi-
tures, but then choose not to do so in specific instances, that
are subject to subsection (j). Thus, an organization should
never be subject to a greater “penalty” (or tax) under subsec-
tion (j) than it would have had to pay under (i)(4). For if the
“penalty” under (j) would be greater than (i)(4), the organi-
zation would simply choose not to disclose any contributions
or expenditures and pay tax under (i)(4). Because it is rea-
sonable to assume that Congress did not intend organizations
that partially comply with the statute to pay more than those
that do not, the IRS could issue regulations stating that the
payment required to be paid under subsection (j) shall not
exceed what would have been paid under (i)(4). Such a
reasonable interpretation of the statute would likely be up-
held, and would ensure that section 527 as written would
come within the Regan subsidy rationale.
Finally, the court accepted that the relevant legal question
is whether the statute eliminates a subsidy or creates a penalty.
But in answering that question, the court looked at subsection
(j) by itself. It did not consider section 527 as a whole. If we
consider subsection (j)’s import as part of section 527, we
see that the statute as a whole falls within the subsidy rationale
in Regan.
Although the government has argued that subsection (j)
provides a choice to exempt organizations whether to disclose
34Id. at 32-33. This conclusion, however, appears to be somewhat
weakened by the court’s determination that section 527’s expenditure
disclosure provisions are unconstitutional. The court concluded that
“[w]hile the enforcement method chosen by Congress could not con-
stitutionally have been imposed on other tax-exempt organizations with-
out modification, the disclosure requirement itself could constitutionally
have been imposed on such organizations.” Id.
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or not, it can also be seen as an enforcement mechanism
applicable to organizations that choose to opt-in to the regu-
latory structure. The statute as written provides that an or-
ganization may opt-in to the statutory framework by filing
with the  Secretary or  it may opt-out  and pay tax on its
income.39 If it opts-in, it is then subject to the disclosure
requirements. Subsection (j) is not an attempt to provide more
options, but instead can be seen as a provision to enforce the
original decision to opt-in or not. Once an  organization
chooses the benefit of tax-exempt status it must disclose.
Subsection (j) merely enforces that disclosure and requires
that organizations that fail to disclose pay the amount estab-
lished in subsection (j).40 If this analysis is correct, section
527 meets the subsidy rationale because the subsidy is being
conditioned upon an organization’s willingness to comply
with the regulatory structure. Organizations that are not will-
ing to do so must pay a tax under (i)(4). Organizations that
are willing to do so are exempt. Subsection (j) merely deals
with organizations that agree to comply with the statute, but
then do not do so. In that instance, the penalty may exceed
the amount of the subsidy. If it did not, all organizations
would choose to be exempt under (i) and then not disclose
under (j).
B. Buckley Approach
In addition to concluding that the Regan analysis is the
initial framework for considering the decision, the court also
supported the position of campaign finance reformers by
recognizing that the issue/express advocacy standard pro-
moted by plaintiffs was not the proper standard under Buck-
ley. The  district court believed that speech advocating a
political result could be regulated under Buckley even if it
was not express advocacy, and specifically rejected the idea
that the absence of express advocacy was issue advocacy.
This decision opens the door for scholars and litigants arguing
for a middle ground between express and issue advocacy.41
Campaign finance reform advocates may be less thrilled
with the court’s analysis of the government’s interest in regu-
lating campaign activity. The court recognized that the speech
at issue here could be regulated consistent with Buckley if it
satisfied an important government interest. It rejected, how-
ever, that the interests presented in Buckley, namely the in-
formation interest and the corruption rationale, were present
here. In this regard, the court failed to recognize that both
the information interest and the corruption rationale were
present here and were sufficient to establish important gov-
ernment interests.42
First, the court appears to conclude that the information
interest was not served here because the statute was not strong
enough. The court concluded that because the disclosure does
not tie a specific expenditure to any candidate it does not
satisfy the informational interest present in Buckley. This,
however, ignores that although the expenditure disclosure
provision may not in and of itself disclose who the expendi-
ture supports, the disclosure along with knowledge of the
expenditure does. For example, knowing that the Fund for a
Great America spent $50,000 on advertisements does not
necessarily promote the informational interest in Buckley, but
knowing that the Fund spent $50,000 on advertisements at-
tacking a specific candidate does. Absent the disclosure pro-
vision in section 527, it might be impossible to tie the adver-
tisement to the Fund for a Great America. It is the combination
of the disclosed information with public information that is
already available that promotes the government’s informa-
tional interest.43
Next, the court concluded that the expenditure disclosure
provision does not satisfy the government interest in prevent-
ing corruption. In this regard, the court required convincing
evidence that the disclosure provisions were necessary to
prevent corruption. Even if this standard is correct, a point
that I think is highly debatable, there is clearly convincing
evidence that undisclosed expenditures by political organi-
zations can have a corrupting influence on the electoral sys-
tem. In fact, the advertisements by Republicans for Clean Air
that shot life into the current reform effort highlight the
corruption potential. Absent disclosure provisions it would
have been impossible to compel Republicans for Clean Air
to disclose the source of its funds.44 The source turned out
39An organization that wishes to opt-out is not required to notify the
IRS of that choice. All organizations that file to opt-in are subject to
tax.
40If Congress did not require some type of penalty on undisclosed
expenditures under (j), section 527 organizations could obfuscate the
purposes of the act by disclosing all contributions and no expenditures.
It is often unhelpful to know who funds an organization if one does not
know who the organization supports. This problem is partially rectified
by Federal  Communication Commission  rules  that require  political
television advertisements to carry the name of the sponsor of the adver-
tisement. See 47 U.S.C. 317 (2002); 47 C.F.R. 73.1212.
41Professor Edward Foley has recently suggested that an advertise-
ment that compares two political candidates should be considered an
election advertisement for FECA purposes. See Edward B. Foley, “Smith
for Congress” and Its Equivalents: The Importance of Chamber of
Commerce v. Moore, forthcoming in the ELECTION LAW JOURNAL.
42See Landell v. Vermont Public Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d
129 (2002) (finding strong enough corruption and information interests
for far stricter campaign finance restrictions than those present here).
43Recent scholarship indicates that disclosure provisions, even as
they apply to organizations not officially affiliated with a candidate,
satisfy important informational interests because they provide voters
with clues as to which organizations or individuals support various
candidates. These clues help voters establish candidates’ positions and
empower voters. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign
Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, Chicago Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 19, at 11-13 (forthcoming
27 OK. CITY. U. L. REV. __ (2002)) (“Voting cues must provide accurate
information to voters in order to empower them: that is, the limited
information that citizens obtain must allow them to draw correct con-
clusions . . . ”).
44After some pressure, Sam and Charles Wyly disclosed that they
were the sponsors of the advertisements. The Wyly brothers spent $2.5
million on the advertisements praising then-Governor Bush and attack-
ing Senator McCain. Charles Wyly was also one of President Bush’s
“pioneer” fund-raisers and raised at least $100,000 for the president’s
campaign. He and his brother also each contributed $100,000 to the
Bush-Cheney Inaugural Committee. Michael Petrocelli, “Bush Names
Wife of Campaign Supporter to Kennedy Center,” Houston Chronicle,
Apr. 11, 2002 at A5.
Special Reports
48 October 2002 — Vol. 38, No. 1 The Exempt Organization Tax Review
to be a long-time friend of President Bush. Moreover, the
wife of one of the sponsors of the commercial was recently
appointed to the Kennedy Center Board by President Bush.45
It is just this type of appearance of corruption that disclosure
provisions are intended to address.46
C. Tenth Amendment Analysis
With regard to the court’s Tenth Amendment analysis, the
court’s conclusion that Congress was not exercising its taxing
authority is puzzling. Under Regan, Congress may choose
not to subsidize through a tax exemption political organiza-
tions that fail to disclose contributors and expenditures. There
is no reason why Congress should be required to subsidize
such organizations if they fail to comply with disclosure
provisions simply because the organizations are engaged in
state and local advocacy. Such an interpretation would in
effect force Congress to provide a tax exemption to state and
local political organizations. These organizations have no
more right to such an exemption than organizations involved
in advocacy at the federal level.
Moreover, the court’s Tenth Amendment analysis shares
the same error that the court made in striking down the
expenditure limits. The court examines subsection (j) inde-
pendently to determine that it is not a tax provision. Subsec-
tion (j) must be examined as part of section 527. If the entire
section is considered, the provision is clearly an attempt by
Congress to eliminate tax subsidies for organizations that fail
to comply with the disclosure provisions. It does not matter
that significant revenue is not raised by the particular statute.
The provision helps create fairness and equity in the code by
preventing taxpayers from subsidizing organizations engaged
in secret political speech.47
V. Conclusion
In all, campaign reform advocates should be pleased with
the district court’s decision in National Federation of Repub-
lican Assemblies. The court accepted the government’s posi-
tion that a tax-exempt organization’s tax status can be con-
ditioned upon the entity’s willingness to comply with
campaign finance disclosure provisions. In fact, the court
indicated that the reasons for upholding the statute in this
instance may be extended to regulating other tax-exempt
organizations. Thus, the tax subsidy rationale from Regan
will continue to provide a framework for campaign finance
reform as more and more tax-exempt entities engage in po-
litical advocacy.48
Moreover, the court, in interpreting Buckley, used a more
flexible test and rejected the issue/express advocacy dichot-
omy that so many courts are currently using. By recognizing
that speech other than express advocacy can be regulated
under Buckley the decision increases the chances that disclo-
sure provisions will be upheld even outside of the exempt
organization tax subsidy framework.
To the extent the court struck down the disclosure provi-
sions, the alleged infirmities can easily be fixed. Congress
can amend section 527 and clarify that the penalty under
subsection (j) can never exceed that amount that an organi-
zation would have had to pay had it not chosen to be an
exempt organization. Alternatively, Congress can clearly set
out the government’s informational and corruption interests
that justify campaign finance disclosure provisions.
The most immediate impact of this decision, however, is
to give credence to the IRS’s current push to require political
organizations to comply  with section 527.49 The district
court’s decision clearly requires that organizations involved
in political advocacy at the federal level wishing to be tax-
exempt comply with the notice provisions in section 527(i)
and the contribution disclosure provisions in subsection (j).
Section 527 organizations would therefore be wise to comply
with the IRS’s current regulations until a final decision is
reached in this case.
45Charles Wyly’s wife, Caroline Wyly, was appointed by President
Bush to serve on the John F. Kennedy Center Advisory Committee on
the Arts. 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 615 (Apr. 15, 2002).
46The legislative history surrounding the amendments to section 527
also indicates that Congress was concerned with the potential for cor-
ruption posed by undisclosed campaign expenditures. See 146 Cong.
Rec. S5995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman)
(“None of us should doubt that the proliferation of these groups — with
their potential to serve as secret slush funds for candidates and parties,
their ability to run difficult-to-trace attack ads, and their promise of
anonymity to those seeking to spend huge amounts of money to influence
our elections — poses a real and significant threat to the integrity and
fairness of  our elections.”). Moreover,  according to Public Citizen,
political organizations are now being used and controlled by candidates
to promote their candidacies. To the extent that these organizations are
not involved in express advocacy, they contend that they are not subject
to FECA. Public Citizen identified 61 members of Congress who have
political organizations and the top 25 political organizations collected
approximately $30 million in a two-year election cycle. See “Congres-
sional Leaders’Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance
Reform Bills,” Public Citizen, at 1, Feb. 26, 2002.
47The court’s Fifth Amendment analysis has no impact on the deci-
sion. The court concluded that if the disclosure provision violates the
First Amendment it also violates the Fifth Amendment, and if it can
withstand First Amendment scrutiny it also survives Fifth Amendment
scrutiny.
48To the extent organizations are now trying to conduct political
advocacy through other exempt organizations, such as (c)(4) organiza-
tions, the district court opinion should give them pause. If the perceived
abuse by section 527 organizations is transferred to 501(c)(4) organi-
zations, Congress can, under the  district  court’s logic, expand the
disclosure provisions to cover other exempt organizations.
49IRS News Release IR-2002-84 (July 1, 2002) (warning political
organizations that they have only 15 days to submit past-due or corrected
items); IRS Notice 2002-34, 2002-21 IRB 990 (IRS announcement of
voluntary compliance program to promote disclosure by political or-
ganizations).
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